BFT consensus threshold is validator-count-weighted, not stake-weighted (Sybil risk)

[RUKAYAT-CODER]

Background

bft_consensus.rs::update_consensus_state computes the Byzantine threshold purely from the count of active validators (n = 3f+1 → 2f+1 votes required), even though the same function already tracks each validator's stake (total_stake, VALIDATOR_STAKES):

/// # TODO
/// - Weight the threshold by stake rather than validator count to make
///   Sybil attacks more expensive (stake-weighted BFT).
fn update_consensus_state(env: &Env) -> Result<(), BridgeError> {
    ...
    // Byzantine threshold: 2f+1 where n = 3f+1
    // For n validators, we need ceil(2n/3) + 1 for BFT
    ...
}

Because the threshold only depends on the number of active validators and not their stake, an attacker can cheapen a Sybil attack by registering many low-stake validators rather than needing to acquire a proportional share of total stake — undermining the economic security assumption typical BFT-with-stake systems rely on.

Implementation Plan

• Change update_consensus_state (and the vote-counting logic in vote_on_proposal) to weight votes/threshold by validator stake rather than raw validator count, while preserving the 2f+1-equivalent safety margin expressed in stake terms.
• Ensure property_based_tests.rs's existing BFT safety/liveness properties (quorum intersection, threshold monotonicity) are updated to validate the stake-weighted formula rather than the count-based one.
• Add a test/property demonstrating that registering many low-stake validators no longer reduces the effective attack cost below the equivalent honest-majority stake threshold.

Acceptance Criteria

• Consensus threshold and vote counting are computed from validator stake, not validator count
• Existing BFT property tests are updated and still pass under the stake-weighted model
• A new test demonstrates Sybil resistance (many low-stake validators can't cheaply reach threshold)