diff --git a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml index 719718a..5d5ab59 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml @@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ name: public-repo-guard # wave-av/.github must not be able to alter another repo's secret scanner). The # gitleaks binary is version-pinned AND SHA-256-verified before it runs. # -# To install on a new repo, copy all three files together: +# To install on a new repo, copy all five files together: # .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml # .gitleaks.toml # scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh +# scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +# scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh # # Scan scope: the published working TREE (gitleaks --no-git), NOT git history. The # goal is "what is public right now is clean", so a shallow checkout is sufficient. @@ -25,24 +27,71 @@ name: public-repo-guard # path glob to a repo-root `.guardignore`, or extend the repo-local `.gitleaks.toml`. on: + # `edited` matters as much as `opened`: a body can be made to leak long after the + # PR is first raised, and until this workflow covered it, nothing ever re-scanned. pull_request: + types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize] + issues: + types: [opened, edited] + issue_comment: + types: [created, edited] + # Review summaries and review-thread comments are just as world-readable as the + # PR body, and `issue_comment` does NOT fire for them — only for top-level PR + # comments. Without these two triggers, review text went unscanned. + pull_request_review: + types: [submitted, edited] + pull_request_review_comment: + types: [created, edited] push: branches: [main, master] workflow_dispatch: +# `pull_request`, deliberately NOT `pull_request_target`: a fork PR must never get +# a write token or repo secrets just because a gate wanted to read its body. permissions: contents: read -concurrency: - group: public-repo-guard-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true +# Concurrency is per JOB, not per workflow: the two jobs want opposite behaviour. +# A workflow-level group would force one policy on both, and it showed: comment and +# issue events (which the tree job skips entirely) cancelled in-flight tree scans, +# so a chatty review thread could leave a head SHA with NO completed tree verdict. +# Per-job groups end that: only same-PR pull_request and review events enter the +# tree group. +# Within that group, a body edit or new push still supersedes an in-flight tree run +# — deliberately. The replacement scans the same (or newer) head SHA and always +# lands a completed verdict, and GitHub evaluates the most recent check run per +# name, so the superseded run's cancelled record is cosmetic, not load-bearing. jobs: guard: name: Secrets + content policy + # Skips issue/comment events (the tree scan has nothing to say about a comment, + # and the org should not pay for a gitleaks run every time anyone posts one). + # That is safe ONLY because those runs report the DEFAULT branch, not the PR + # head. Review events are different: they run in the PR's context and publish + # a check run on the PR HEAD SHA, and a job skipped by `if` still publishes + # one with conclusion `skipped`, which GitHub treats as passing while + # evaluating the MOST RECENT check run per name. Skipping them would let any + # review comment supersede a failing tree scan with a green rubber stamp, so + # they re-run the tree scan instead (same reason `edited` is not skipped: + # re-running just reproduces the verdict). + # Review events on a CLOSED PR are the one exception: nothing gates a closed + # PR, and refs/pull/N/merge goes stale after close, so checking it out can + # fail and paint a spurious red on the required check. A skipped run is + # harmless exactly there: a rubber stamp with nothing left to stamp. + if: >- + github.event_name == 'pull_request' + || ((github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' + || github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment') + && github.event.pull_request.state == 'open') + || github.event_name == 'push' + || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' + concurrency: + group: public-repo-guard-tree-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5.0.1 + - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 # gitleaks' GitHub Action requires a paid license for organizations; the CLI # itself is MIT-licensed and free. Pin the version AND verify the release @@ -64,10 +113,129 @@ jobs: - name: gitleaks (secret scan — published tree) run: gitleaks detect --no-git --source . --config .gitleaks.toml --redact --no-banner --exit-code 1 - - name: Install ripgrep - run: command -v rg >/dev/null || (sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq ripgrep) + # Both policy scripts are rg -P (PCRE2), and Ubuntu's apt ripgrep is built + # WITHOUT PCRE2 — with it, every rule exits 2 and the required check goes + # permanently red. Install the upstream binary the same way as gitleaks: + # version-pinned and SHA-256-verified. Skipped when a PCRE2-capable rg is + # already on the image. + - name: Install ripgrep (PCRE2-capable, pinned + checksum-verified) + env: + RIPGREP_VERSION: "14.1.1" + RIPGREP_SHA256: "4cf9f2741e6c465ffdb7c26f38056a59e2a2544b51f7cc128ef28337eeae4d8e" + run: | + if command -v rg >/dev/null && rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi + curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o ripgrep.tar.gz \ + "https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/releases/download/${RIPGREP_VERSION}/ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz" + echo "${RIPGREP_SHA256} ripgrep.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - + tar -xzf ripgrep.tar.gz "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" + sudo install -m 0755 "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" /usr/local/bin/rg + rm -rf ripgrep.tar.gz "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" + rg --pcre2-version - name: content policy (WAVE trade-secret / internal-leak gate) env: GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS: ${{ vars.GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS }} run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh . + + # The body gate's own fixtures. Its negatives are the load-bearing half — a + # leak gate that blocks legitimate cross-repo references gets switched off, + # and then it protects nothing. Runs here so a regression is caught by CI + # rather than by a leak. + - name: body policy self-test (fixtures) + run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh + + # The other half of a public repo's surface. `guard` above scans the published + # TREE; a PR/issue/comment/review BODY is just as world-readable and, until + # this job, was scanned by nothing server-side. That gap was real, not theoretical: a PR + # was blocked for naming a private repo in wrangler.toml while the very same + # name, with more operational detail attached, sat unchallenged in its body. + # + # Honest about what it can and cannot do. On a PR this PREVENTS the merge. On an + # issue or comment the text is already public the moment it posts, so this is + # detection — it tells us to go redact, fast. Only the client-side pre-write hook + # can stop that class before publication. + body-guard: + name: Body content policy + # Review events on a CLOSED PR are excluded for the same reason as in `guard` + # above: refs/pull/N/merge goes stale after close, so the checkout can fail + # and paint a spurious red on the PR. The cost is a detection gap — a review + # comment on a closed PR goes unscanned server-side — accepted because a + # guaranteed-flaky red is worse than no verdict, and the pre-write hook is + # the control that stops that class before publication anyway. (Comments on + # closed PRs still arrive as `issue_comment` and ARE scanned; only review + # summaries and review-thread comments are affected.) + if: >- + github.event_name == 'pull_request' + || github.event_name == 'issues' + || github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + || ((github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' + || github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment') + && github.event.pull_request.state == 'open') + concurrency: + # Keyed on the MOST SPECIFIC object in the payload, and the comment/review id + # must come FIRST: `pull_request_review` and `pull_request_review_comment` + # payloads carry a top-level `pull_request` object, so a PR-number-first chain + # would short-circuit and file every review comment on a PR under ONE group. + # GitHub keeps at most one PENDING run per group, so a review submitted with + # several inline comments would silently drop the middle ones — distinct + # comments are distinct world-readable texts, and each needs its own verdict. + # A ref-keyed group has the same flaw (issue events all report the default + # branch). Only same-object versions may share a group: the newest scan of an + # edited body covers what is public now. + # + # cancel-in-progress is deliberately FALSE. Every version of a body deserves a + # verdict, the job is seconds long, and a cancelled check-run lingers on the + # commit and makes an otherwise-green PR look broken. + group: public-repo-guard-body-${{ github.event.comment.id || github.event.review.id || github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: false + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + # Only the gate's own scripts are needed — no reason to pay for the whole + # tree on every comment. + sparse-checkout: scripts/public-repo-guard + sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false + + # Same PCRE2 requirement as the tree job above — apt's ripgrep won't do. + - name: Install ripgrep (PCRE2-capable, pinned + checksum-verified) + env: + RIPGREP_VERSION: "14.1.1" + RIPGREP_SHA256: "4cf9f2741e6c465ffdb7c26f38056a59e2a2544b51f7cc128ef28337eeae4d8e" + run: | + if command -v rg >/dev/null && rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi + curl -fsSL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -o ripgrep.tar.gz \ + "https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/releases/download/${RIPGREP_VERSION}/ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz" + echo "${RIPGREP_SHA256} ripgrep.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - + tar -xzf ripgrep.tar.gz "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" + sudo install -m 0755 "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/rg" /usr/local/bin/rg + rm -rf ripgrep.tar.gz "ripgrep-${RIPGREP_VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" + rg --pcre2-version + + # The body is read straight out of the event payload FILE and written to + # another file. It is never interpolated into a run: block and never placed + # in an environment variable, so shell metacharacters in a hostile PR body + # have nothing to act on. jq is preinstalled on the GitHub-hosted images. + - name: Materialize the untrusted title/body to a file + run: | + set -euo pipefail + mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan" + # An UNRECOGNIZED payload shape must fail, never quietly scan nothing and + # report a pass. If the event schema ever moves, this job must go red + # rather than become a green rubber stamp over an unscanned body. + if [ "$(jq -r 'has("pull_request") or has("issue") or has("comment") or has("review")' "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH")" != "true" ]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard (body-guard)::Event payload contains no pull_request/issue/comment/review object — refusing to report a pass on an unscanned body." + exit 1 + fi + jq -r '[.pull_request.title, .pull_request.body, + .issue.title, .issue.body, + .review.body, + .comment.body] + | map(select(. != null)) | join("\n")' \ + "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" + echo "scanning $(wc -l < "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt") line(s) of body text" + + - name: body policy (PR / issue / comment text) + env: + GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS: ${{ vars.GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS }} + run: bash scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/bodyscan/body.txt" diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..282c535 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# WAVE public-repo BODY policy — the internal-leak gate for PR/issue/comment text. +# +# Companion to content-policy.sh. That script scans the published working TREE; +# this one scans the other half of a public repo's surface: pull-request titles +# and bodies, issue bodies, and comment bodies. Those are equally world-readable +# and, until this script existed, were scanned by NOTHING server-side. That gap +# was not theoretical — a PR was merged whose wrangler.toml was correctly BLOCKED +# for naming a private repo while the PR body named the same repo, with more +# operational detail attached, and sailed through. +# +# Usage: scripts/public-repo-guard/body-policy.sh +# holds the untrusted text, already materialized to disk. It is passed as +# a PATH and only ever read — the body is never interpolated into a command line +# or an environment variable, so no amount of shell metacharacters in a PR body +# can influence what runs here. +# +# Exit: 0 clean · 1 blocking violation · 2 scanner error (fail closed). +# +# Allowlisting: a line carrying `guard:allow ` is exempt (an accidental +# leak never carries the marker; a deliberate one is visible in a public diff). +# The ABOUT-THE-CONTROL allowlist below additionally exempts the HEURISTIC prose +# rules only — a credential format is a leak no matter what else the line says. +set -uo pipefail + +FILE="${1:-}" +[[ -n "$FILE" && -f "$FILE" ]] || { echo "::error::body-policy: usage: body-policy.sh "; exit 2; } +command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "::error::body-policy: ripgrep (rg) required"; exit 2; } +# Every rule here is -P (PCRE2). Distro rg packages are sometimes built without +# it; that build fails every scan with exit 2, so refuse it up front with a +# message that says WHY instead of 21 opaque "ripgrep failed" annotations. +rg --pcre2-version >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "::error::body-policy: this ripgrep build lacks PCRE2 (-P) — install a PCRE2-capable rg"; exit 2; } + +VIOLATIONS=0 + +# Lines that TALK ABOUT the control rather than leaking through it. Without this, +# the gate blocks its own pull requests and every security discussion — the +# self-referential trap that gets a gate switched off. Ported verbatim in intent +# from the client-side gate's allowlist, which was built for exactly this. +# +# SCOPE: only rules that opt in via the `prose` flag honour this allowlist — the +# HEURISTIC rules, whose matches are ordinary words that genuinely occur when +# discussing the gate. The credential-format and infrastructure rules never +# honour it: a real key is a leak even on a line that names SECURITY.md, and +# exempting it there would make "mention the policy" a one-line bypass. +ABOUT_THE_CONTROL='(public-repo-guard|body-policy|content-policy|public-github-write-gate|\bNDA\s+(gate|guard|policy|denylist|sweep|scan|hook)\b|\bno\s+NDA\b|responsib\w*\s+disclos|SECURITY\.md)' + +# check [prose] +# The optional 5th arg `prose` marks a HEURISTIC rule whose hits may also be +# legitimate discussion of the gate itself; only those honour ABOUT_THE_CONTROL. +check() { + local sev="$1" name="$2" re="$3" why="$4" scope="${5:-}" + [[ -z "$re" ]] && { echo "::error::body-policy: internal bug — empty regex for rule '$name'"; exit 2; } + # rg exit: 0=match, 1=no match, >=2=real error → FAIL CLOSED. A gate that passes + # because its scanner broke is worse than no gate: it reports success. + local raw rc + raw="$(rg -nP --no-filename -- "$re" "$FILE" 2>/dev/null)"; rc=$? + if (( rc >= 2 )); then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::ripgrep failed (exit $rc) scanning rule '$name' — failing closed." + exit 2 + fi + # Filter with rg, not grep: BSD/macOS grep has no -P, so a `grep -P` allowlist + # silently errors out locally while working on GNU/CI — the gate would then + # disagree with itself depending on where it ran. rg is already required above. + local matches + matches="$(printf '%s' "$raw" \ + | rg -vN -- 'guard:allow[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]' || true)" + if [[ "$scope" == "prose" ]]; then + matches="$(printf '%s' "$matches" | rg -vNiP -- "$ABOUT_THE_CONTROL" || true)" + fi + [[ -z "$matches" ]] && return 0 + local count; count="$(printf '%s\n' "$matches" | grep -c '')" + # Print the LINE NUMBER only — never the matched text. This annotation is itself + # world-readable, so echoing the hit would re-publish the very thing we caught. + echo "::group::[$sev] $name — $why" + printf '%s\n' "$matches" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+):.*/ line \1: «match redacted — view the body to see it»/' + echo "::endgroup::" + if [[ "$sev" == "BLOCK" ]]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard ($name)::$why — $count occurrence(s) in the title/body. Edit the body to remove it, then re-run." + VIOLATIONS=$((VIOLATIONS+1)) + else + echo "::warning title=public-repo-guard ($name)::$why — $count occurrence(s) (non-blocking; review)." + fi +} + +# --- Credential formats — never legitimate in prose -------------------------- +check BLOCK stripe-live-key '(sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' 'Live Stripe secret/restricted key' +check BLOCK stripe-account 'acct_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' 'Live Stripe account ID — financial infra, never publish' +check BLOCK anthropic-key 'sk-ant-(api|admin)[0-9]{2}-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}' 'Real Anthropic API/admin key' +check BLOCK github-pat 'github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{30,}' 'GitHub fine-grained PAT' +check BLOCK supabase-pat 'sbp_[a-f0-9]{40}' 'Supabase personal access token' +check BLOCK aws-akid 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' 'AWS access key ID' +check BLOCK private-key '-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' 'Embedded private key material' + +# --- Infrastructure identifiers ---------------------------------------------- +# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID is literal guidance text +check BLOCK cf-account-id 'account_id\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"']?[0-9a-f]{32}' 'Hardcoded Cloudflare account_id — reference the env var instead' +check BLOCK internal-ip '100\.(6[4-9]|[7-9][0-9]|1[01][0-9]|12[0-7])\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}' 'Internal Tailscale-CGNAT IP (100.64.0.0/10) — internal fleet address' +# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # $HOME is literal guidance text +check BLOCK abs-user-path '/(Users|home)/(?!runner/)[a-z][a-z0-9._-]+/' 'Operator absolute home path — leaks identity and local layout' + +# --- Self-identified internal material --------------------------------------- +# USE vs MENTION. A body that SAYS "internal-only" is leaking; a body that QUOTES +# the phrase is describing a policy — including this one. The lookarounds exempt a +# marker wrapped in straight, smart, or backtick quotes. +# +# Not hypothetical: the first run of this job failed on its own pull request, +# because a review bot had edited the PR body to summarize the change and its +# summary quoted the phrase verbatim. The line-level allowlist could not help — +# that line named no gate. Only use-vs-mention separates the two. +# +# A quoted marker is also a trivial bypass, and that is an accepted trade. The +# threat here is the ACCIDENTAL paste; a deliberate evader has easier routes, and +# `guard:allow ` already exists as the honest, visible one. +check BLOCK internal-marker '(?#260"). A gate that fires on all of +# those gets switched off, and then it protects nothing. +# +# So a bare mention stays silent. What fires is a private repo name within ~140 +# characters of INTERNAL OPERATIONAL DETAIL — a SCREAMING_CASE credential NAME, a +# secret-binding verb, a service binding, or a secret COUNT. That is the topology +# of what is wired to what, and it is the shape that actually leaked. +# +# Names are NOT hardcoded (this file is public); CI injects them via the +# GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS variable. Unset locally → this check is skipped. In CI +# (GITHUB_ACTIONS set) an empty variable FAILS CLOSED instead: a missing or +# renamed org variable would otherwise silently skip this rule and report a +# pass over an unscanned leak class: a green rubber stamp, not a verdict. +_ALT='' +if [[ -n "${GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS:-}" ]]; then + # The credential-NAME alternative is SCREAMING_CASE on purpose (that is how a + # binding name is written; `session_token` in prose is just code talk), so it + # must stay case-SENSITIVE. The phrase alternatives are ordinary English and + # get their own scoped (?i:) — never a global flag, which would silently make + # the SCREAMING_CASE branch match lowercase identifiers too. + OPS_DETAIL='(?:[A-Z][A-Z0-9]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD)|(?i:wrangler\s+secret|secret\s+(?:is\s+)?(?:bound|binding|list)|(?:is\s+)?bound\s+on|service\s+binding)|\d{2,}\s+secrets)' + IFS=', ' read -r -a _PRIV <<< "$GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS" + for _name in "${_PRIV[@]}"; do + [[ -z "$_name" ]] && continue + # Regex-escape so metacharacters in a name match literally. + _esc="$(printf '%s' "$_name" | sed -E 's/[][(){}.^$*+?|\\]/\\&/g')" + _ALT="${_ALT:+$_ALT|}${_esc}" + done +fi +if [[ -n "$_ALT" ]]; then + # Both orders: name-then-detail and detail-then-name. Case-insensitivity is + # scoped to the repo NAMES only — see the OPS_DETAIL comment above. + # No \b in front of OPS_DETAIL in either branch: for a multi-segment name + # like WAVE_VIEWPORT_LEASE_SECRET the credential alternative can only match + # the trailing LEASE_SECRET, and that position is NOT a word boundary + # (underscore is a word character) — a \b there silently drops every + # compound credential name from the name-first order. + check BLOCK private-repo-ops \ + "\\b(?i:${_ALT})\\b[^\\n]{0,140}?${OPS_DETAIL}|${OPS_DETAIL}[^\\n]{0,140}?\\b(?i:${_ALT})\\b" \ + 'A private WAVE repo named alongside internal operational detail (credential name, secret binding, or secret count) — the wiring topology is not public' prose +elif [[ -n "${GITHUB_ACTIONS:-}" ]]; then + echo "::error title=public-repo-guard (private-repo-ops)::GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS is empty: the org/repo variable is missing, renamed, or contains no names. Refusing to report a pass over an unscanned leak class; configure the variable (fails closed in CI only)." + exit 2 +fi + +if (( VIOLATIONS > 0 )); then + echo "::error::public-repo-guard: $VIOLATIONS blocking body-policy violation(s) — see annotations above." + exit 1 +fi +echo "public-repo-guard: body policy OK" diff --git a/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..f76e8f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/public-repo-guard/tests/body-policy.test.sh @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Fixture tests for body-policy.sh. +# +# Deliberately fixture-only: the gate is NEVER proved by writing a real leak into a +# live public PR body, because doing so would publish the exact thing it guards. +# +# The negatives here are the load-bearing half. A leak gate that blocks everything +# is trivially "correct" and useless — it gets disabled within a week. The bare +# cross-reference case below is the one that keeps this gate deployable. +set -uo pipefail + +SCRIPT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)/body-policy.sh" +TMP="$(mktemp -d)" +trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT + +# The names the real gate is configured with come from an org variable; the tests +# pin their own so they are hermetic and do not depend on CI configuration. The +# names are deliberately SYNTHETIC: this file is public and exempt from both tree +# scanners, so a real private repo name written here would itself be a leak. +export GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS="example-private-alpha, example-private-bravo, example-private-charlie" + +PASS=0; FAIL=0 + +# expect +expect() { + local want="$1" name="$2" body="$3" out rc + printf '%s\n' "$body" > "$TMP/body.txt" + out="$(bash "$SCRIPT" "$TMP/body.txt" 2>&1)"; rc=$? + if [[ "$rc" == "$want" ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s\n' "$name" + else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — want exit %s, got %s\n%s\n' "$name" "$want" "$rc" "$out" + fi + # The annotation is world-readable; a hit must never echo the matched text. + if [[ "$rc" == 1 ]] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qF "$body"; then + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — LEAKED the matched text into the annotation\n' "$name" + fi +} + +echo "body-policy fixtures" + +# --- must BLOCK --------------------------------------------------------------- +expect 1 'private repo + credential name' \ + 'Flip is live: WAVE_VIEWPORT_LEASE_SECRET is bound on example-private-alpha now.' +expect 1 'private repo + credential name, reverse order' \ + 'The MOQ_JOIN_SECRET was added; example-private-bravo picks it up on deploy.' +# Regression: a MULTI-segment credential name after the repo name. The rule can +# only match the trailing LEASE_SECRET, which sits mid-word (after an +# underscore) — a \b in front of OPS_DETAIL silently dropped this whole order. +expect 1 'private repo, then compound credential name' \ + 'example-private-alpha now uses WAVE_VIEWPORT_LEASE_SECRET for renewals.' +expect 1 'private repo + secret count' \ + 'example-private-alpha went from 74 secrets to 75 after this change.' +expect 1 'private repo + service binding' \ + 'This adds a service binding from the worker to example-private-charlie for settlement.' +expect 1 'operator home path' \ + 'Repro: run it from /Users/someoperator/Documents/notes and it fails.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) +expect 1 'internal-only marker' \ + 'Attaching the internal-only rollout plan for context.' +# Assembled at run time rather than written as a literal: a fixture that LOOKS like +# a live AWS key trips this repo's own pre-commit secret scanners (it did, on the +# first draft). Splitting the prefix keeps the fixture exercising the real regex +# without parking a credential-shaped string in source. +AKID_FIXTURE="AKI""A1234567890ABCDEF" +expect 1 'AWS access key id' \ + "The failing job had ${AKID_FIXTURE} configured." +expect 1 'internal tailscale IP' \ + 'It resolves to 100.71.4.19 from inside the fleet.' +# Regression: ABOUT_THE_CONTROL is scoped to the heuristic prose rules. A real +# credential must block even when the same line talks about the gate — otherwise +# "mention the policy" is a one-line bypass of every format rule. +expect 1 'credential on a line that mentions the policy' \ + "Discussing public-repo-guard: the key ${AKID_FIXTURE} was rotated." +expect 1 'private key on a line citing SECURITY.md' \ + "Per SECURITY.md: -----BEGIN RSA ""PRIVATE KEY-----" # pragma: allowlist secret (fixture, split like AKID above) + +# --- must PASS (precision — these keep the gate deployable) ------------------- +expect 0 'bare private-repo cross-reference' \ + 'This is the companion change to example-private-bravo#260; merge that one first.' +expect 0 'two private repos, no operational detail' \ + 'Both example-private-alpha and example-private-bravo will need a follow-up for this.' +expect 0 'credential NAME with no private repo nearby' \ + 'The handler now reads SOME_API_TOKEN from the environment instead of a literal.' +# Regression: the SCREAMING_CASE credential-name branch is case-SENSITIVE. A +# global (?i) once leaked onto it and lowercase code talk near a repo name +# (`session_token`) blocked ordinary prose — exactly the false-positive class +# that gets a gate switched off. +expect 0 'lowercase code identifier near a private repo' \ + 'The example-private-alpha worker reads session_token from the request header.' +expect 1 'repo name cased differently still pairs with a credential NAME' \ + 'Example-Private-Alpha now requires LEASE_SECRET at deploy time.' +expect 0 'talking about the gate with a repo name and credential NAME' \ + 'body-policy blocks example-private-alpha next to a SECRET_TOKEN; that is intended.' +expect 0 'public runner path is not an operator path' \ + 'CI checks out to /home/runner/work/repo/repo before the scan runs.' # enforce-ignore (fixture) +expect 0 'talking about the control' \ + 'body-policy blocks a private repo named next to a SECRET_TOKEN; that is intended.' +expect 0 'explicit guard:allow with a reason' \ + 'Example for the docs: example-private-alpha holds EXAMPLE_SECRET — guard:allow documented-example' +expect 0 'ordinary clean body' \ + 'Bumps the draft revision and regenerates the fixtures. No behaviour change.' +# Regression: the first CI run of this job failed on its own PR, because a review +# bot edited the body to summarize the change and quoted the marker verbatim. +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in straight quotes is a description' \ + 'Blocks infra identifiers and markers (account_id, home paths, "internal-only" text).' +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in a code span' \ + 'The rule matches `internal-only` and `for internal use` in body text.' +expect 0 'marker MENTIONED in smart quotes' \ + 'Blocks operator home paths and “internal-only” text.' +expect 1 'marker USED unquoted still blocks' \ + 'Attaching the internal-only rollout plan; do not share outside the team.' + +# --- fail closed -------------------------------------------------------------- +# Invoked directly, not through expect(): expect() always materializes a file, so +# it cannot reach these paths. A gate that returns "OK" when it was handed nothing +# to scan is the failure mode this whole file exists to prevent. +for case in "no argument at all::" "nonexistent path::$TMP/does-not-exist.txt"; do + name="${case%%::*}"; arg="${case##*::}" + if [[ -n "$arg" ]]; then bash "$SCRIPT" "$arg" >/dev/null 2>&1; else bash "$SCRIPT" >/dev/null 2>&1; fi + rc=$? + if [[ "$rc" == 2 ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s → exit 2 (fails closed)\n' "$name" + else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s — want exit 2, got %s\n' "$name" "$rc" + fi +done + +# An empty GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS is a documented local convenience but FAILS CLOSED +# in CI (GITHUB_ACTIONS set): a missing or renamed org variable must go red, never +# silently skip the private-repo rule and report a pass over an unscanned class. +printf '%s\n' 'Ordinary clean body with nothing to find.' > "$TMP/body.txt" +env -u GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS GITHUB_ACTIONS=true bash "$SCRIPT" "$TMP/body.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1 +rc=$? +if [[ "$rc" == 2 ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s → exit 2 (fails closed)\n' 'GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS unset in CI' +else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s: want exit 2, got %s\n' 'GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS unset in CI' "$rc" +fi +env -u GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS -u GITHUB_ACTIONS bash "$SCRIPT" "$TMP/body.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1 +rc=$? +if [[ "$rc" == 0 ]]; then + PASS=$((PASS+1)); printf ' ok %s → exit 0 (rule skipped)\n' 'GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS unset locally' +else + FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); printf ' FAIL %s: want exit 0, got %s\n' 'GUARD_PRIVATE_REPOS unset locally' "$rc" +fi + +echo " ---" +if (( FAIL > 0 )); then + echo " $PASS passed, $FAIL FAILED"; exit 1 +fi +echo " $PASS passed, 0 failed"