ci: pin all GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain attacks#643
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
ci: pin all GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain attacks#643XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Summary
Several workflow files reference GitHub Actions pinned to mutable version tags (e.g.
@v4.2.2,@v4.1.7,@v1.13.0,@0.15.0). Tags are mutable — an attacker who gains write access to an upstream Action repository can silently move a tag to point to malicious code, which then executes in re2's CI pipelines and release workflows.The release workflow has
id-token: writeandattestations: writepermissions, making a compromised Action particularly dangerous (Sigstore signing can be abused, release artifacts tampered with).Affected files
.github/workflows/ci.yml.github/workflows/ci-cmake.yml.github/workflows/ci-bazel.yml.github/workflows/pages.yml.github/workflows/python.yml.github/workflows/release.yml.github/workflows/release-bazel.ymlVulnerability class
Supply-chain attack via mutable Action tag references (CWE-829). See GitHub Security hardening guide.
Fix
All actions are now pinned to their full immutable commit SHA with the version tag as an inline comment for human readability.