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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -42,7 +42,15 @@ jobs:
name: Secrets + content policy
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5.0.1
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0

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馃攳 Verify the commit SHA actually corresponds to checkout v7.0.0

The action is pinned by SHA with a trailing # v7.0.0 comment. The security value of the pin depends entirely on that SHA being the real v7.0.0 tag commit of actions/checkout; the comment cannot be validated from within this repo. Worth a one-time manual confirmation against the upstream tag before merge.

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with:
# Checkout defaults to persisting the job token for later steps: since v6 it
# lives in a file under $RUNNER_TEMP referenced from .git/config, no longer in
# .git/config itself. It is still a live credential in the job, and this job
# downloads a third-party binary (gitleaks, below) and runs it over the whole
# tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
# so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
persist-credentials: false

# gitleaks' GitHub Action requires a paid license for organizations; the CLI
# itself is MIT-licensed and free. Pin the version AND verify the release
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